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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 
§78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Wasatch Front Regional MLS ("Wasatch Front") joins in and adopts by reference the 
statements of the issues on appeal set forth in the Brief of Defendants/Appellees Utah 
Association of Realtors and Christopher Kyler, in the Brief of Defendant/Appellee Galanty 
Bowers, and in the Brief of Defendants/Appellees Salt Lake Board of Realtors and Bryan R. 
Kohler. Additionally, the following issues on appeal are also relevant to Wasatch Front: 
Issue 1: Whether the district court's dismissal of Bates's Fifth Cause of Action may 
be affirmed on the alternative ground that the claim is time barred under Utah's Three Year 
Statute of Limitation. 
Issue 2: Whether the district court's dismissal of Bates's Sixth through Ninth Causes 
of Action may be affirmed on the alternative ground that the claims fail to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted against Wasatch Front. 
Issue 3: Whether the district court's dismissal of Bates's Sixth Cause of Action for 
abuse of process may be affirmed on the alternative ground that this claim fails to allege that 
Wasatch Front improperly used or participated in an administrative proceeding. 
Issue 4: Whether the district court's dismissal of Bates's Seventh and Eighth Causes 
of Action may be affirmed on the alternative ground that these claims fail to allege the 
elements required by Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. horn. 
580443.1 - 1 
Standard of Review: Although a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss is 
typically reviewed for correctness with no deference granted to the decision of the district 
court, Hudgens v. Prosper, Inc., 2010 UT 68, f 14, 243 P.3d 1275, there is no standard of 
review applicable to this Court's consideration of the issues presented inasmuch as Wasatch 
Front seeks affirmance of the district court's order on grounds not ruled upon by the district 
court. 
Rather, based on the "affirm on any ground" rule recognized by Utah courts, Wasatch 
Front requests that this Court affirm the dismissal of Bates's Fifth through Ninth Causes of 
Action on the basis that they fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted and because 
certain portions of Bates's Fifth Cause of Action and the entirety of Bates's Seventh and 
Eighth Causes of Action are time barred. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, If 9, 52 P.3d 
1158. This Court may affirm the district court's entry of judgment "if it is sustainable on any 
legal ground or theory apparent on the record." Puttuck v. Gendron, 2008 UT App 362, f^ 
13,199 P.3d 971 (affirming trial court's dismissal of plaintiff s abuse of process claim, while 
rejecting court's basis for so doing, because the claim was formally deficient and failed to 
state a claim for which relief could be granted); Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, ffi[ 2,22-23,184 
P.3d 1226 (affirming trial court's dismissal of petition for post-conviction relief on 
alternative grounds that petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted); 
O'Nealv. Div. ofFamilyServs., 821 P.2d 1139,1141 (Utah 1991) (affirming district court's 
denial of motion to dismiss on an alternative ground and stating that "we will also endeavor 
to uphold a trial court's ruling, even if we must consider alternative grounds on which the 
court below did not rely"). 
On appeal, "[t]he original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court . . . shall 
constitute the record on appeal in all cases." UTAH R. APP. P. 11. These alternative grounds 
are apparent on the face of Bates's Second Amended Complaint (the "Complaint"). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code section 78B-2-305(4) provides that: 
An action may be brought within three years . . . for a liability created by the 
statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this 
state, except where in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the 
statutes of this state. 
Utah Code section 78B-2-307 provides that 
An action may be brought within four years . . . for relief not otherwise 
provided for by law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below. 
A statement of the Nature of the Case, the Course of Proceedings, and the Disposition 
Below is set forth in the Brief of Defendants/Appellees Utah Association of Realtors and 
Christopher Kyler, which statement Wasatch Front hereby joins in and adopts by reference. 
II. Statement of Facts Relevant to Wasatch Front. 
Because the Court is reviewing the district court's dismissal of Bates's Complaint, the 
following factual allegations contained in Bates's Complaint are deemed to be true for 
purposes of this appeal: 
1. In July 1995, Bates applied for a Broker's Subscription to Wasatch Front's 
multiple listing service (the "Listing Service") and was told that he needed to fulfill the 
prerequisites of obtaining a "Designated Realtor Membership" from the Salt Lake Board of 
Realtors ("SLBR"), thereby becoming a member of the Utah Association of Realtors 
("UAR"). Wasatch Front's Policies and Procedures Manual required Bates to become a 
member of a member board of the UAR in order to become a subscriber to the Listing 
Service. [R. 265, If 23]. 
2. The Listing Service is a vital resource for any Utah real estate broker and is the 
primary means through which a majority of Utah residential real estate transactions take 
place. [R. 265,124]. 
3. As of July 1995 and in 1997, SLBR was the parent company and owner of 
Wasatch Front. [R. 265-66, ffif 24, 26]. 
4. Beginning in 1997, member boards of the UAR, including NWAR, UCAR, 
Cache County Association of Realtors, and the Tooele County Association of Realtors, began 
combining their multiple listing service exchanges with the Listing Service and operated 
shared exchanges. [R. 266, f^ 26]. 
5. Each Board/Association operates, and is incorporated, individually. The 
agreement to share MLS exchanges under the Listing Service was an agreement to exclude 
nonmember Utah real estate licensees under Wasatch Front policies. [R. 266, f 27]. 
6. In2004, Bates foundedUtahMLS.com ("UtahMLS"), amultiple listing service 
exchange competing with the Listing Service. [R. 266, *[  28]. 
7. UtahMLS included a state-wide broker property listing exchange that was also 
open to the public. UtahMLS also provided state licensees with full service access to all 
properties listed for sale through UtahMLS broker subscribers and allowed "For Sale By 
Owners" to list and advertise properties on UtahMLS without requiring membership in any 
UAR member board and without a real estate licensee. [R. 266-67, f^ 29]. 
8. Under UAR and SLBR policies, a SLBR designated realtor member was 
required to pay annual fees of more than three hundred dollars for all State licensees under 
a broker's license to SLBR, even if the licensee had no desire to be a Realtor. Wasatch Front 
required broker subscribers to pay a monthly fee of twenty five dollars for each licensee 
under the principal broker's license, even if the licensee was not a Realtor or a subscriber to 
the Listing Service. [R. 267, fflf 30-31]. 
9. These policies required Bates and other brokers subscribing to the Listing 
Service to pay fees to a UAR member board and to Wasatch Front for all licensees under 
their principal broker's license even if the licensee has no desire to subscribe to the Listing 
Service. [R. 267, ffif 32-33]. 
10. UtahML S created an alternative for brokers, real estate agents and non-licensee 
sellers that wanted to list "For Sale by Owners" listings. Unlike the Listing Service 
subscribers, subscribers to UtahMLS did not need to pay fees for multiple associations, and 
did not have to use a brokerage in order to gain access to UtahMLS. [R. 267, ^ 34]. 
11. At the time Bates was creating UtahMLS, he was serving on SLBR's board of 
directors. Concerned about the possibility of a conflict of interest with his Utah real estate 
leadership position, Bates raised the issue with SLBR, who owned Wasatch Front. In a letter 
to Bates, Ford Scalley (SLBR's counsel) exonerated and complimented Bates for offering 
to excuse himself from SLBR's board of directors. [R. 267-68, ^ 35]. 
12. Ultimately, SLBR concluded that there would be no conflict of interest, as long 
as Bates excluded himself from the Listing Service's monthly reports to SLBR. However, 
as time went on, executives at SLBR, NWAR, UAR and Wasatch Front became more 
concerned when UtahMLS started gaining recognition within the real estate brokerage 
industry. They were also concerned that UtahMLS offered services to consumers and "for 
sale by owners." [R. 268, f 36]. 
13. At one point, in or around April 2005, in a SLBR Board of Director's meeting, 
Debra Sojblum singled Bates out as a participant in the competing UtahMLS. Immediately 
thereafter Bates resigned from SLBR's board of directors. [R. 268, f^ 37]. 
14. In February 2005, during the early release of UtahMLS, Wasatch Front 
addressed UtahMLS in its newsletter, stating that 
1. The WFR has been operating for over ten years, is the largest MLS in 
the State of Utah, and also includes listings in neighboring states 
2. Ourpublicweb site, UtahRealEstate.com averages 130,000 page views 
per day and contains over 16,000 active listings 
3. Our private website is used by over 10,000 subscribers and contains 
over 550,000 listings 
4. The WFR is certified by the National Association of REALTORS® and 
the Utah Association of REALTORS®. 
We are REALTOR® owned and operated. So don't be fooled by others who 
claim to the MLS for Utah. WFR subscribers have the advantage. 
[R. 268, If 38]. 
15. In early 2006, concerned that competing UtahMLS was taking root, Wasatch 
Front implemented new changes in their "Policy and Procedure's Manual." The new 
policies targeted the UtahMLS business model. [R. 269,140]. 
16. The policy (the "Policy") governed the use of the terms "MLS" and "Multiple 
Listing Service" by the Listing Service's subscribers, [R. 269, ^ [41, R. 336], and discouraged 
agent subscribers of the Listing Service from trying UtahMLS for fear that, under the Policy, 
their access to the Listing Service would be terminated. [R. 269, ^ 42-43]. 
17. The Policy could be read to imply that use of another non-Board multiple 
listing service would violate the Policy and subject the Listing Service user to termination 
and/or legal action. [R.269,f44]. 
18. Bates objected to the Realtor Board's and Wasatch Front's tactics and 
interference with current and potential UtahMLS subscribers. [R. 269,145]. 
19. Upon Bates's objection, his and some of his branch brokers' access to the 
Listing Service was suspended and blocked in April 2006. [R. 270, f 46]. 
20. As a result, on April 4, 2006, Bates sent a letter to James Naccarato, Wasatch 
Front, SLBR, Defendant Kohler, NWAR, Defendant Ostermiller, Kevin Call, and the Utah 
County Association of Realtors expressing surprise and alarm at the Policy. [R. 270, fflf 48-
49]. 
21. On April 6, 2006, Wasatch Front's President, James Naccarato responded to 
Bates's letter and denied that the Policy was anti-competitive, stating in part that the Policy 
only addressed misrepresentations made by brokers to the public. However, Mr. Natured's 
letter also explained that the Policy did limit the rights of brokers, and that Wasatch Front 
had not refused access to the Listing Service to Bates or any other broker based on the Policy. 
The letter also stated that "[upon execution of the appropriate subscription agreement, you 
will have the same access all other subscribers have." [R. 270, f 50, R. 336-37]. 
22. Mr. Natured's letter further explained that "[if a few brokers are allowed to 
advertise that consumers may access the multiple listing service database, then those few 
brokers may succeed in turning the multiple listing service into a public utility, and will 
irreversibly change the nature of the multiple listing service for all brokers. If [Wasatch 
Front] fails to enforce the Policy, it is likely over time that the multiple listing service 
database will become what brokers are currently advertising, and that is a public facility for 
any consumer who wants to have access." Continuing, "[only brokers, agents, office 
assistance, and other authorized persons have access to the multiple listing service database." 
[R. 270-71,1f 51]. 
23. Mr. Natured's letter closed by stating that "[upon your acceptance of the 
subscription agreement, your status as a subscriber will be restored." [R. 271, j^ 52]. 
24. On April 11, 2006, Jeremy Layman, then serving as a director of SLBR, 
composed and sent a letter to Defendant Kohler, SLBR, and SLUR's President, Sharon 
Sprawled including Mr. Layman's professional opinion that the Policy was vague and unfair. 
[R. 271, Iff 53-54]. 
25. Mr. Layman questioned any person's rights over the term "MLS" and then 
explained the Policy in comparison with other competitors' use of the term MLS, including, 
Yahoo.comandMLS.com. [R. 271, ^ 54]. 
26. Mr. Layman then asserted in his letter that no violation of the Policy had 
occurred, implying that Wasatch Front's refusal to allow Bates access to the Listing Service 
held ulterior anti-competitive motives which were directly discriminatory. [R. 271, f 55]. 
27. On June 22, 2006, John Rees, Wasatch Front's registered agent, composed a 
letter to Ford G. Scalley discussing this debate. The letter referred to a suspension of the 
enforcement of the Policy while it was reviewed by legal counsel and the National 
Association of Realtors. [R. 271, j^ 56]. 
28. Mr. Rees's letter stated that Mr. Lyman's letter raised legitimate issues and 
discussed a meeting between Wasatch Front's board of directors to discuss the issue but that 
Wasatch Front would begin to enforce its modified policy on August 1, 2006 and explained 
that "many, many potential violations" were expected. [R. 272, ^57; Appellant's Brief, at 
Appendix A]. 
29. Mr. Rees's letter also referenced correspondence exchanged between Wasatch 
Front and Laurene K. Janik, general counsel for NAR. On June 6, 2006, Ms. Janik sent a 
letter to John Rees that acknowledged Wasatch Front's policy allowing it to amend its 
policies in its sole discretion was in compliance with the NAR, and that "[Wasatch Front] 
may continue to enforce its policy on "Use of MLS." [See Appellant's Appendix, at Exhibit 
A]. 
30. Bates was discriminated against in the enforcement of the Policy. Many 
multiple listing service websites exist, and upon Bates's information and belief, the UAR and 
National Association of Relators ("NAR") have shown no indication of enforcing the Policy 
against other prominent organizations operating them. [R. 272, f 58]. 
31. On June 28, 2006, Wasatch Front sent an email to licensees under Bates's 
broker's license and stated that "[if your broker fails to complete a Subscription Agreement 
by July 3, 2006, your access to the Listing Service will be interrupted." [R. 272, f 59]. 
32. On June 29,2006, Wasatch Front sent an email to employees of AllPro stating 
that "your broker promptly accepted the Subscription Agreement and your access is no longer 
in jeopardy of interruption." [R. 272, *|[ 60]. 
33. To compel Bates's compliance with the Policy, Wasatch Front terminated 
Bates's and some of his branch brokers' access into the Listing Service during the two month 
standoff, allowing only the agents and administrators under Bates's subscribership access. 
[R. 272, If 62]. 
34. As a result of SLUR, NWAR, UCAR and Wasatch Front's policy changes, 
UtahMLS lost momentum and future subscribers because the Policy implied that use of 
another MLS exchange that did not strictly conform to Wasatch Front's definitions and 
compliance would be grounds for termination from the Listing Service and legal action. [R. 
273,1(63]. 
35. On October 9, 2009, Brad Baldwin, acting as an agent of Wasatch Front, sent 
Bates a letter stating in part 
I noticed that you own the utahmls.com domain name . . . under rules of 
National Association of REALTORS and the WFRMLS, no broker or agent 
subscriber to the WFRMLS may use the term "MLS" in their business name 
or domain name. We believe the value of your domain name is therefore 
limited, since it cannot be used by brokers or agents conducting real estate 
business. Since AllPro is no longer operating, I thought you might consider 
selling this domain name to the WFRMLS. 
[R. 273, H 65]. 
36. Wasatch Front then offered to purchase the domain name "UtahMLS .com" for 
$2,000. [R. 273,1| 66]. 
37. After Bates was expelled from SLUR, Bates's subscription, and Bates's 
daughter's subscription to the Listing Service were terminated. [R. 275, f 81]. 
38. Because the Listing Service is the primary median under which a majority of 
real estate transactions in Utah take place, Bates's brokerage suffered and Bates allowed his 
broker's license with the UDRE to expire on December 31, 2008. [R. 275,1fil 82-83]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In addition to the grounds upon which the district court based its dismissal of Bates's 
Complaint, Bates's Fifth through Ninth Causes of Action may be dismissed on grounds not 
considered by the district court, namely that those Causes of Action fail to state claims upon 
which relief can be granted, and that portions of Bates's Fifth Cause of Action and the 
entirety of his Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action are time barred. This Court may affirm 
on these grounds because they are apparent upon review of the allegations contained in 
Bates's Complaint. 
Bates's Fifth Cause of Action for violation of the Unfair Practices Act fails to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted because the conduct of Wasatch Front as alleged 
by Bates does not violate the Unfair Practices Act. Additionally, to the extent that Bates's 
Fifth Cause of Action is based upon the Policy, it is time barred. 
Bates's Sixth Cause of Action for abuse of process fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted because Bates failed to allege that Wasatch Front participated in the 
UDRE proceedings and because, although Bates alleged an improper motive, Bates did not 
allege that any defendant engaged in an act not proper in the regular prosecution of the 
proceedings. 
Bates's Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action for tortious interference fail to state 
claims upon which relief can be granted because they do not adequately plead that Wasatch 
Front took any action for an improper purpose or by improper means. Additionally, they are 
time barred. 
Finally, Bates's Ninth Cause of Action for civil conspiracy fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted because Bates has failed to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted on any other underlying tort. 
ARGUMENT 
Wasatch Front joins in and adopts by reference the arguments contained in the Brief 
of Defendants/Appellees Utah Association of Realtors and Christopher Kyler, in the Brief 
of Defendant/Appellee Galanty Bowers, and in the Brief of Defendants/Appellees Salt Lake 
Board of Realtors and Bryan R. Kohler. 
In addition to the arguments made by those parties, the Court may affirm the district 
court's dismissal of Bates's Complaint on several other grounds as set forth below. 
A. The Court Should Affirm the District Court's Order on the Alternative Grounds 
that Bates's Fifth Through Ninth Causes of Action Fail to State Claims Against 
Wasatch Front Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted and Because Certain of 
Bates's Claims are Time Barred. 
Because Bates's Fifth through Ninth Causes of Action fail to state claims upon which 
relief can be granted, and because certain other claims are time barred, and in the interest of 
judicial economy, the Court should affirm the district court's order on alternative grounds. 
It is well established1 that an appellate court may affirm the district court's order 
1
 Since 2011, the Utah Supreme Court has affirmed decisions made by lower courts 
on alternative grounds in numerous cases. See Blaisdell v. Dentrix Dental Sys., Inc., 2012 
if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even 
though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be 
the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or 
theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower 
court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court. 
Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, 1 18, 29 P.3d 1225 (citation omitted). "The goal of the 
affirm on any ground rule is judicial economy." Okelberry v. West Daniels Land Ass 'n, 2005 
UT App 327,1f 11, 120 P.3d 34. 
As articulated below, Bates' Fifth through Ninth Causes of Action fail to state claims 
against Wasatch Front upon which relief can be granted. Additionally, it is apparent on the 
face of the Complaint that a portion of Bates's Fifth Cause of Action and the entirety of his 
Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action are time barred. In the interest of judicial economy, 
the Court should affirm the district court's order on alternative grounds. 
B. Wasatch Front's Alleged Discriminatory Enforcement of its Policy Occurred 
More Than Three Years Before Bates Filed His Second Amended Complaint. 
Because Wasatch Front's alleged discriminatory targeting of Bates occurred more than 
three years before Bates filed his Second Amended Complaint asserting claims against 
Wasatch Front, the portion of his Fifth Cause of Action targeting the Policy is time barred. 
Pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-2-305(4), an action must be brought within three 
years "for a liability created by the statutes of this state . . . except where in special cases a 
different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state." Bates concedes that the three-
UT 37, t 5, n.l, — P.3d —; Kelt v. State, 2012 UT 25,131, — P.3d —; State v. Walker, 
2011 UT 53,1 18, 267 P.3d 210; Sanpete America, LLC v. Willardsen, 2011 UT 48, U 38, 
269 P.3d 118; Haikv. Sandy City, 2011 UT 26,%10, 254 P.3d 171; Bahr v. Irnus, 2011 UT 
19, f l 21, 57, 250 P.3d 56; Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17,1ffl 4, 104, 250 P.3d 465; 
Neffv. Neff, 2011 UT 6, HH 51, 92, 247 P.3d 380. 
year statute of limitations applies to his Fifth Cause of Action. Appellant's Brief, at p. 14. 
That Bates's claims based upon Wasatch Front's alleged discriminatory enforcement 
of the Policy are time barred is apparent on the face of Bates's Complaint. According to the 
Complaint, Bates's subscription to the Listing Service was improperly blocked between April 
and June of 2006. [R. 321, <fl 347].2 Yet, Bates did not assert any claim against Wasatch 
Front until nearly five years later, when on May 4, 2011, Bates filed his Second Amended 
Complaint. [R. 261]. As a result, to the extent that Bates's Fifth Cause of Action is based 
upon Wasatch Front's allegedly selective enforcement of the Policy, Bates's claim is time 
barred. 
C. Wasatch Front's Implementation and Enforcement of its Policies and Procedures 
Does Not Give Rise to a Claim for Abuse of Process. 
Bates's Sixth Cause of Action against Wasatch Front for abuse of process fails to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted because Bates has not alleged that Wasatch Front 
instituted, or participated in, any legal process against him and because Bates has not alleged 
that Wasatch Front acted improperly in any legal process. 
To state a claim for abuse of process, a plaintiff must allege the defendant's "ulterior 
purpose . . . [and] an act in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the 
proceedings." Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, ^ 34, 102 P.3d 774. 
2Bates alleges that Wasatch Front selectively enforced the Policy against him [R. 306, 
1ffl 268, 275], but only alleges that the Policy was enforced against him between April and 
June of 2006. [R. 321, H 347]. 
Inherent in a claim for abuse of process, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant 
actually used or otherwise participated in legal process. Id. at | 33 ("Abuse of process 
applies to one who uses a legal process . . . ") (emphasis added). 
Also, because an "improper act may not be inferred from the motive", a plaintiff must 
specifically allege that the defendant engaged in "an act in the use of the process not proper 
in the regular prosecution of the proceedings" and may not rely on an allegation of an ulterior 
motive or purpose alone. Hatch, 2004 UT App 378 at f| 34-35 ("it was not enough for 
Defendant to allege that Plaintiff was motivated by bad intentions when he filed the lawsuits 
against him"). "A very restrictive view is taken of [the element that defendant used the legal 
process primarily for an impermissible or illegal motive]." Palmer v. Tandem Mgmt. Servs., 
Inc. , 505 N.W.2d 813, 817 (Iowa 1993) ("there is no abuse of process when the action is 
filed to intimidate and embarrass a defendant knowing there is no entitlement to recover the 
full amount of damages sought. Proof of an improper motive by the person filing the lawsuit 
for even a malicious purpose does not satisfy this element"). 
In the case of Caldwell-Baker Co. v. Tideman? the Kansas Court of Appeals describes 
the "improper act" requirement as follows: 
Generally, therefore, no right of action exists for damages resulting from the 
institution and prosecution of a civil action if the action is confined to its regular and 
legitimate function in relation to the cause of action stated in the complaint, even if 
the plaintiff had an ulterior motive in bringing the action, or if the plaintiff knowingly 
brought suit upon an unfounded claim. However, if the suit is brought not to recover 
on the cause of action stated in the complaint but to accomplish a purpose for which 
the process was not designed, there is an abuse of process. For example, a person who 
resorts to legal process to have another declared incompetent or committed to a state 
mental hospital does not commit an abuse of process, no matter what the person's 
3Nos. 95,600, 95,618, 2007 WL 136029. at *7 (Kan. Ct. Ann. Tan. 19. 9.007V 
motives, if he or she uses the commitment proceedings in order to provide treatment 
to a mentally disabled individual; however, an action may be maintained where the 
defendant perverts the process in order to commit a person that he or she knows is not 
in need of treatment. 
Id. In other words, a party who institutes process with the aim of accomplishing its stated 
objective even while knowing that the claim is unfounded is not liable for abuse of process. 
Bates's Sixth Cause of Action does not state a claim against Wasatch Front because 
Bates does not allege that Wasatch Front instituted, or participated in, any administrative 
proceeding against Bates.4 
Additionally, while Bates has alleged that at least some defendants had an ulterior 
purpose, namely "to force [Bates] to comply with uncompetitive industry practices or remove 
[Bates] as a competitor" [R. 315,1f 323], Bates has not alleged that Wasatch Front, or any 
defendant, engaged in an act in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution 
of the proceedings. Bates alleges that "individuals in the Utah Division of Real Estate were 
trying to find a way around current law to punish [Bates] despite the understanding that a 
dispute over nonpayment of commissions does not warrant disciplinary action by the Utah 
Division of Real Estate" [R. 315-316,1326]. This allegation does not satisfy the improper 
act requirement because the UDRE proceedings were confined to their regular and legitimate 
function in relation to the objective stated in the Petition; namely "to revoke Bates' license." 
[R. 276, Tf 89]. That the Petition did not accomplish its intended purpose does not mean that 
4To the extent that Bates bases his Sixth Cause of Action against Wasatch Front on 
the basis that "each Defendant was acting as the agent of the other, and each was acting in 
the course and scope of its agency with its principal", Wasatch Front joins in the rule 8 
argument contained in the Brief of Defendants/Appellees Utah Association of Realtors and 
Christopher Kyler. 
the Petition constituted an improper use of the proceedings. In the interest of judicial 
economy, the Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of Bates's Sixth Cause of 
Action. 
D. Bates's Allegations are Insufficient to Support a Claim of Tortious Interference 
with Current or Prospective Economic Relations. 
Bates's Seven and Eighth Causes of Action for tortious interference with existing 
contractual relationships and tortious interference with prospective economic relationships 
respectively fail as a matter of law because the allegations in Bates's Complaint, and the 
documents attached thereto, conclusively show that Wasatch Front's alleged termination of 
Bates's subscription to the Listing Service between April 2006 to June 2006 was not done 
for an improper purpose or by improper means. 
A claim for intentional interference with economic relations "protects both existing 
contractual relationships and prospective relationships of economic advantage not yet 
reduced to a formal contract." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 
200 (Utah 1991). To succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that "(!)••• the 
defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, 
(2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." Leigh 
Furniture & Carpet Co. v. horn, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). 
With respect to the second element, only one alternative, either improper purpose or 
improper means, need be established; a plaintiff need not prove both. See id. at 307. Bates's 
Complaint fails to adequately allege either. 
1. Wasatch Front Terminated Bates's Subscription to the Listing Service for a 
Valid Economic Purpose. 
To establish an improper purpose, it is not enough to show that the defendant was 
motivated by ill will toward the plaintiff. See id. Rather, the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant's "predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff." Id. 
Bates's own allegations in the Complaint state that Wasatch Front's President, James 
Natured, informed Bates by letter dated April 6, 2006, that Wasatch Front's policy 
prohibiting subscribers of the Listing Service from using the terms "MLS" and "Multiple 
Listing Service" in domain names, like Plaintiffs domain name "utahmls.com," was to 
prevent subscribers from creating a multiple listing service that was a public utility, and 
thereby, "irreversibly changing] the nature of the multiple listing service for all brokers." 
[R. 270-71, Tf 51]. Wasatch Front's enforcement of this policy was for the valid purpose of 
protecting its goodwill in the Listing Service and protecting its legitimate economic interest 
of maintaining a subscription based multiple listing service. Such a purpose is not improper. 
See St. Benedict's Dev. Co., 811 P.2d 194, 201 (Utah 1991) ("[t]here is no allegation that 
defendants' desire to harm the development company predominated over their legitimate 
economic motivations"). 
Accordingly, Bates has not sufficiently plead an improper purpose. 
2. Wasatch Front's Revocation of Bates's Access to the Listing Service was not 
Done by Improper Means. 
To establish the second alternative, improper means, a plaintiff must show "that the 
defendant's means of interference were contrary to statutory, regulatory, or common law or 
violated an established standard of a trade or profession." Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 
786, 787 (Utah 1994) (internal quotations omitted). 
For the reasons shown above, Bates has failed to allege a violation of the Utah Unfair 
Practices Act, and has not alleged that Wasatch Front's revocation of his access to the Listing 
Service violated any other law. 
Furthermore, the June 22, 2006 Letter, from John Rees, counsel for Wasatch Front, 
specifically references Wasatch Front's right pursuant to Section 47.i of Wasatch Front's 
Policies and Procedures, which right states: "[t]hese Policies and Procedures . . . may be 
amended from time-to-time by WFR, in its sole discretion." [R. 271, f 56]. Wasatch Front's 
amendment to the Policy, and its revocation of Bates's access to the Listing Service until he 
agreed to be bound by the amended Policy, were within Wasatch Front's contractual rights. 
The NAR also recognized the Policy as being within the standards acceptable in the 
industry. On June 6,2006, Laurene K. Janik, General Counsel for NAR, sent a letter to John 
Rees that acknowledged Wasatch Front's policy allowing it to amend its policies in its sole 
discretion was in compliance with the NAR, and that "[Wasatch Front] may continue to 
enforce its policy on "Use of MLS." [See Appellant's Appendix, at Exhibit A]. 
Bates's failure to sufficiently allege that Wasatch Front's revocation of his access to 
the Listing Service in April 2006 to June 2006 was a violation of law, or that Wasatch Front 
violated industry standards, is fatal to Bates's claim that Wasatch Front's alleged interference 
with his economic relations was done by an improper means. Wasatch Front is therefore 
entitled to dismissal of Bates's tortious interference claims for failure to state claims upon 
which relief can be granted. In the interest of judicial economy, the Court should affirm the 
district court's dismissal of Bates's Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action on such additional 
grounds. 
E. Bates's Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action are Time Barred. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Bates's Complaint does state claims of tortious interference 
with both existing and prospective economic relations as a result of Wasatch Front's 
revocation of Bates's access to the Listing Service in April of 2006, Wasatch Front is still 
entitled to dismissal of these claims because the claims are barred by the four-year statute of 
limitations codified in Utah Code section 78B-2-307 (setting forth a four-year statute of 
limitations for all claims not otherwise specified by law). 
In Utah, a "statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues." 
Retherford v. AT & T Commc'ns. of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 975 (Utah 
1992). "A tort cause of action accrues when all its elements come into being and the claim 
is actionable." Id. In the matter at hand, Bates's alleged claims of tortious interference 
would have become actionable in April 2006, when Wasatch Front first revoked his access 
to the Listing Service for his failure to accept the amended Policy. Bates did not file his 
Complaint in this action until May 4, 2011, well beyond the four-year limitation period in 
which a plaintiff may assert claims of tortious interference. Bates has not alleged any facts 
supporting a tolling of the statute. 
As a result, Bates's tortious interference claims alleged in his Seventh and Eighth 
Causes of Action are time barred, and this Court should affirm the district court's dismissal 
of these claims for this alternative reason. 
F. Bates's Claim for Civil Conspiracy Fails Because he has Not State Any Other 
Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted. 
Because Bates's Fifth through Eighth Causes of Action fail to state a claim upon 
which any relief can be granted, Bates's Ninth Cause of Action for civil conspiracy must be 
dismissed. 
"The claim of civil conspiracy requires, as one of its essential elements, an underlying 
tort." Puttuck v. Gendron, 2008 UT App 362, \ 21, 199 P.3d 971 (quotation omitted). 
Therefore, when a plaintiff has failed to "adequately plead[] any of the basic torts they allege 
. . . dismissal of their civil conspiracy claim is appropriate." Id. 
Because Bates's Fifth through Eighth Causes of Action fail to state any claim against 
Wasatch Front upon which relief can be granted, Bates's civil conspiracy claim fails and 
must be dismissed. In the interest of judicial economy, the Court should affirm the district 
court's dismissal of Bates's Ninth Cause of Action. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Wasatch Front respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
the district court's dismissal of Bates's Complaint with prejudice. 
Dated this 22nd day of August, 2012. 
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